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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALICIA LARSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
MARC LARSON, ] 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
) CaseNo.930550-CA 
) Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(i) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in modifying the decree of divorce to transfer 
physical custody of the parties' children to their father in the event that the mother moved to 
Corvalis, Oregon. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award appellant attorney's fees and 
costs in connection with the petition to modify. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§30-3-5, 30-3-10, 30-3-10.2, 30-3-10.3, 30-3-10.4 (Supp. 
1993), copies of which are included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from an order of the trial court on a petition to modify a decree of 
divorce. The court found that it was in the best interests of the children that, in the event 
their mother chose to move to Corvalis, Oregon, the children remain with their father in Park 
City, Utah. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court 
Defendant/petitioner/appellee Marc S. Larson (hereinafter "Marc") filed his verified 
petition for modification of the decree of divorce on November 6, 1992. The trial was held 
on April 15, 1993, in the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of Utah, 
before the Honorable David S. Young. At the conclusion of trial, the court made a bench 
ruling. Thereafter, the court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order 
modifying the decree of divorce on July 26, 1993. Plaintifl^respondent/appellant Alicia 
Larson (hereinafter "Alicia") appeals from the order modifying the decree of divorce. The 
notice of appeal was filed August 24,1993. 
Statement of Facts 
After ten years of marriage, Marc and Alicia Larson were granted a decree of divorce 
on April 29, 1992. (R. 56). Three children were born during their marriage: Brandi, born 
May 26, 1984, April, born July 20, 1985, and Angie, born October 14, 1987. (R. 56, 66). 
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The decree of divorce incorporated the parties' stipulation and property settlement 
agreement and provided, in pertinent pan, that: 
(1) Marc and Alicia were awarded joint legal custody of the children, 
with primary residence of the children to be with Alicia. Marc was awarded the right 
to physical custody of the children during reasonable and liberal times and places, to 
include at least two and one-half weekends every month, extended summer visits, 
one-half of Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, and alternating legal holidays. 
During the summer months, when the children are not in school, the visitation 
schedule was to be adjusted to allow for weekday visits between Marc and the 
children. 
(2) Marc and Alicia were to cooperate in fostering and maintaining one 
another's relationship and parental roles with the children. Each party was to inform 
the other of issues of importance that might arise in the children's lives so as to allow 
the parties to participate jointly in making decisions concerning the children's 
upbringing. If Marc and Alicia were unable to reach an agreement on any such issue, 
they should first attempt resolution of the dispute through mediation before bringing 
the issue to the court for resolution. 
(3) Each party was required to give the other a minimum of thirty days' 
advance written notice prior to relocating from the Park City, Utah, area to allow the 
parties to participate in mediation of any child custody issue prior to relocation. 
(4) Marc was to pay to Alicia child support in the amount of $800 per 
month, per child, totaling $2,400 per month. Marc also was to pay one-half of any 
work-related day care expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor children 
as a result of any out-of-home employment in which Alicia earned taxable income. 
Marc agreed to pay to Alicia alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month for a period 
of five years beginning April 1,1992, and ending on April 1,1997. 
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(5) The marital home was awarded to Alicia. 
(R. 65-73.) 
At the time of the entry of the decree of divorce, Alicia was living in the marital 
residence in Park City with the three children. (T. 15, 76). Marc also continued to reside in 
Park City in his own condominium. (T. 38). Shortly after entry of the decree of divorce, 
Alicia decided to rent out the marital home and planned to move to a condominium in Park 
City with the children. (T. 15, 17, 77). When Alicia's plans to move into this first 
condominium fell through, she rented a second condominium which was also in the Park 
City area. (T. 77-79, R. 145). Alicia and the children lived in this condominium for two 
months, at which point they moved again, this time into a house located on Kingsford 
Avenue in Park City. (T. 17, 80). 
In June of 1992, Alicia attended a workshop on glass fusion in Oregon. While there, 
Alicia met an instructor in one of her classes named Doug Pomeroy. (T. 71). After the 
workshop, Alicia returned to Park City, Utah. 
On July 30, 1992, Alicia wrote a letter to Marc indicating that she intended to open 
an art studio on Main Street in Park City, Utah. She informed Marc that, in order for her to 
operate the business, she would require day care for the children. Marc would be partially 
liable for this expense. (T. 18, 75, 156; Exhibit 6, p.4, Exhibit 8). Alicia subsequently 
rented the art studio at the end of August 1992. In October of that year, Alicia informed 
Marc that she had a change of plans. She was now going to close the art studio and planned 
to marry Doug. Pomeroy and move with the children to Corvalis, Oregon. At that time, 
Alicia planned to move on November 21,1992. (T. 19,160; Exhibit 8). 
Marc filed his verified petition for modification of the decree of divorce on 
November 6, 1992. (R. 76). In the petition, Marc requested that the court enter an order 
restraining Alicia from leaving the state of Utah with the children until after the hearing on 
the petition for modification of decree of divorce. He also requested an order requiring that 
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the parties enter mediation, as required by the decree of divorce, in an effort to resolve the 
issues concerning custody before Alicia removed the children from the state. In the event 
the parties were not able to reach agreement, Marc requested that the court amend the decree 
of divorce awarding physical custody of the children to him, with Alicia to have reasonable 
rights of visitation. (R. 76-79). 
The trial of the petition for modification of decree of divorce took place on April 15, 
1993. (R. 213, 318, T. 1). By that time, Alicia had changed her plans to move to Oregon 
from November 1992 to June 1993. (T. 82, 83). She later changed her plans stating that she 
and the children would not move until they worked out the custody dispute. (T. 167). Alicia 
and Pomeroy had set a wedding date of January 1993. By the time of the trial, they had 
moved the wedding date to some time in June of that same year. (T. 72). Pomeroy and 
Alicia never married. 
Marc is a private practice physical therapist in Park City. He operates his own 
business, Summit Sports Medicine. The business has approximately twenty part-time and 
full time employees. Marc started the business when the parties first moved to Utah in May 
1989. Since that time, Marc has expended substantial effort to expand and enlarge the 
business. (T. 9, 11). In order to do so, he has customarily worked long hours. (T. 10, 29, 
52, 90). By April of 1993, Marc was able for the first time in his career to hire two frill time 
physical therapists to help operate the business. Marc's practice is stable and growing, and 
he is now in a position to leave his business in the hands of other capable people. (T. 12, 45, 
46). Marc intends to cut back on the hours which he has normally worked and to take time 
off in order to be with his children. (T. 9-12,127). 
After the decree of divorce was entered, Alicia attempted to expand her business and 
become a glass fusion artist. (T. 68, 70). In order to do so, she has required the use of 
surrogate care for the children. (T. 75, 98). In the past, even when Alicia was not working, 
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she would use surrogate care to some degree. (T. 46, 90, 91, 98, 127). In order to expand 
her work as an artist, she will be required to continue to use surrogate care. (T. 127). 
Marc acknowledged at the trial for the petition for modification that Alicia was a 
good mother. (T. 20, 22; Exhibit 6, p. 3). Each of the other witnesses at trial agreed with 
this assessment. (T. 50, 57, 96, 120, 182, 192, 200). It was also acknowledged by Alicia 
and other witnesses that Marc is a good and loving father. (T. 48, 49, 57, 96, 120, 134, 175, 
182; Exhibit 6, p. 2). Since the decree of divorce was entered, Marc had taken advantage of 
every opportunity to be with his children. He had followed the visitation schedule set forth 
in the decree of divorce, and had also taken advantage of other opportunities which have 
arisen to be with his children. (T. 42, 91, 92, Exhibit 6, p. 2). He has taken care of the 
children while Alicia was out of town. (T. 30). Marc also began midweek visits with the 
children and visited one day per week with each child at her school in order to have lunch 
with each of them. (T. 14, 32, 91). These visits were discontinued at the request of Alicia, 
who felt that they were too disruptive. (T. 32,135). 
Although Marc testified that Alicia was generally cooperative in providing 
information to him about the children, there had been a number of incidents in which Alicia 
has not consulted Marc with regard to important aspects of the children's lives. In 
December 1992, Alicia began taking the children to see Dr. Doug Brunker for family 
counseling. Marc was never consulted or allowed to participate and only learned about the 
therapy after the fact while the parties were in mediation. (T. 84,141,161, 212). Alicia also 
did not give Marc an opportunity to have any input about her plans for the children in 
Corvalis. The only information which he was provided regarding the schools in Oregon was 
a schedule stating when the school year starts and when it ends. (T. 27,141, 212-213). 
Marc filed his petition to modify because he was concerned that the move to Oregon 
would not be in the children's best interests. All of the children's friends and family live in 
Utah. (T. 25, 137; Exhibit 6, p. 18). They have no family in Oregon and do not know 
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anybody who lives in that state or anywhere nearby except for Pomeroy. (T. 25). The 
children have two half-siblings, a number of aunts and uncles, and many cousins who live in 
Utah. (T. 8, 48, 60, 137). The children also have a number of friends in their neighborhood, 
in church, and in school. 
Marc was also concerned that the move itself would be detrimental to the children in 
that they might be exposed to too many new, confusing, and conflicting things. For 
example, Marc was concerned that the children would no longer continue to be raised as 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("LDS Church"). (T. 21). 
Shortly before Marc and Alicia were married, Alicia joined the LDS Church. (T. 21). The 
children had always attended that church. Alicia discontinued going to church after the 
parties were divorced and has stopped following the tenets of the church. (T. 21, 96, 137, 
150). She has, however, allowed Marc to continue to take the children with him to church. 
Alicia stated that in Oregon, she wished to expose the children to a variety of other religions. 
(T. 141). 
After the decree of divorce was entered, Alicia decided she wished to become a glass 
fusion artist. Previously, she worked in stained glass. She has made no taxable income 
from this business. (T. 68, 70, 75, 76). 
Pomeroy works as a fused glass artist. His yearly income was $15,000 to $25,000. 
(T. 177; Exhibit 6, p. 5). There are very few professionals in this "fusing work." Alicia's 
witness testified that she knows of only two fusion glass artists who make a living in this 
field. (T. 201). One of the artists is from Idaho and is able to do this work by traveling 
around to different areas where art festivals are held. The other earns a living basically by 
teaching workshops. This witness testified that because glass fusion is an art form, it has to 
be sold in galleries and transported to art shows. (T. 210, 203, 204). 
Alicia viewed her relocation to Corvalis, Oregon, as an opportunity to advance her 
career. The area around Corvalis offers fused glass schools and produces the particular glass 
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which is used in this field. (T. 69, 198, 199). Alicia has also been unhappy living in the 
Park City community. (T. 134). When Alicia first stopped attending church, she did so 
because it was uncomfortable for her to be there. (T. 150). 
Pam Thomson, Marc's ex-wife, was one of the witnesses who testified at the trial of 
the petition for modification. She testified how difficult it was for Marc to continue a close, 
strong relationship with their two children after their divorce because Pam was living in 
Utah and Marc was living in Colorado. Pam testified that Marc missed out on a lot of things 
in the children's lives. (T.55). She stated that Marc made every effort to see the children, 
but it was a very difficult situation. (T.54-55). Pam testified that when the parents live in 
different states, it is hard to maintain consistent parenting. (T.58). However, she believes 
Marc is an excellent parent who does not let his work get in the way of being a good father 
to his children. (T.57). 
Kim Peterson, M.S.W., conducted a custody evaluation and testified at trial. Mr. 
Peterson found that Marc and Alicia were equally good parents. (T. 120; Exhibit 6, p. 17). 
If he had to make a choice between the two, given the fact that Alicia has been the primary 
caretaker and Marc's traditional work schedule has been heavy, he would conclude that the 
children were somewhat more closely bonded to Alicia, although the differences are 
minimal. (T. 126; Exhibit 6, pp. 17-18). Mr. Peterson reached this conclusion only after 
being pushed and pressured into making a decision. (T. 125). He stated that he was 
ambivalent about choosing the best placement of the children. (T. 128). The evaluator 
expressed concern about the children relocating to Oregon. The children were ambivalent 
about the move and were experiencing anxiety not only due to the move, but also due to the 
custody battle. (T. 122; Exhibit 6, p. 18). They expressed no specific desire to Mr. Peterson 
to live with either parent. (T. 124). The children did have feelings about being separated 
from their father. Both April and Angie stated that they wished that they could see their dad 
more often. (T. 124, 134; Exhibit 6, pp. 8-9). Mr. Peterson expressed some concerns about 
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Alicia's lifestyle, the fact that she was living with Pomeroy, and her change in religious 
views. He stated that it was important to have roots and close extended family nearby. 
(T. 137, Exhibit 6, p. 18). He also asserted that Marc's lifestyle was more compatible with 
how the children had been raised in the past. (T. 141). 
Mr. Peterson testified that it would be disruptive for the children to leave their father 
and to lose their close regular contact with him. (T. 132, 133, 142; Exhibit 6, p. 18). Mr. 
Peterson's opinion was that the children were well-adjusted in their present custodial 
relationship, and what was in their best interests would be for them to continue to live in 
Utah under the present custodial relationship. (T. 122, 123, 128, 137, 138, 142; Exhibit 6, 
p. 18). 
Mr. Peterson expressed concerns about Alicia's change in religious views. He stated 
that there were indirect indications that she was discouraging the children in their religious 
views and that she was planning to expose them to other religions in Oregon. (T. 141; 
Exhibit 6, p. 18). Mr. Peterson was concerned about the number of changes to which these 
children would be exposed in such a short time. A relocation to another state, leaving 
friends and family behind, being separated from their father, and a potential change in 
religion would be confusing and disruptive for the children. (T. 132,140, 141,144). 
Mr. Peterson did believe that Marc could continue a close relationship with the 
children if they moved; however, he stated that it would be difficult. (T. 128, 140). Mr. 
Peterson was concerned that the close and frequent contact which is required to maintain a 
good relationship might be discouraged by Alicia since she had discouraged visits in the 
past. (T. 135, 140). She had decided to expose the children to other religions in Oregon and 
she began taking the children to therapy, both without informing Marc in advance. She 
never allowed his input about these matters. (T. 135, 141). In addition, she had not 
discussed Marc her plans for the children in Oregon with Marc. Alicia had told Mr. 
Peterson that, in her view, it would be better if Marc saw the children less, so as to prevent 
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the children from ping-ponging back and forth between their parents. (T. 135; Exhibit 6, 
p. 6). She stopped the weekday visits between Marc and the children, and she discouraged 
Marc's weekly lunch visits with the children. (T. 135, 1401). Mr. Peterson also believed 
that part of Alicia's motivation for leaving Utah had to do with her personally wanting to get 
away from Marc. (T. 139). 
Mr. Peterson recommended that Alicia remain the children's primary care giver. 
However, he testified that if Alicia moved to Oregon, physical custody should be contingent 
upon Alicia and Pomeroy not living together without the benefit of marriage and the 
children being raised in the LDS religion. (T. 131,132; Exhibit 6, p. 18). 
After trial, the court ordered that if Alicia were to relocate to Corvalis, Oregon, then 
custody of the three children would automatically transfer to Marc, subject to Alicia's 
reasonable and liberal visitation rights. (T. 238). The court also held that each party was to 
pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs. (T. 240). The court then entered its findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order modifying decree of divorce as proposed by Marc. 
(T. 213,284). The findings of fact specifically include the following: 
4. Plaintiff has been the primary caregiver for the parties1 minor 
children, but defendant has had a significant, active, open involvement in 
their lives. Defendant has fulfilled a traditional role in the children's lives; 
that is, he is the bread winner, and plaintiff has been the person designated to 
raise the children. 
5. Notwithstanding that plaintiff has been the primary caregiver, 
the children are nearly equally bonded to both parents. Defendant is 
extremely committed to his children and wishes to continue to be involved in 
their lives. 
6. Plaintiff and defendant are each excellent parents. Each is 
equally capable of caring for the children. 
7. At best, it is speculative whether a move to Corvalis, Oregon 
would be successful or permanent. In the summer of 1992, plaintiff met 
Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in Corvalis, Oregon, and plaintiff indicated that 
she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry. However, Mr. Pomeroy and plaintiff 
10 
have not yet married and there is a potential for conflict if the family were to 
move in with Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about the move to Corvalis, Oregon 
would enhance the children's educational environment, nor plaintiffs career 
potential. It is a high risk move for plaintiff and the children. 
8. Defendant has exercised all visitation that has been allowed by 
plaintiff and has sought additional visitation. He has been involved in the 
children's school and has been an attentive, caring parent. 
9. The children do not wish to move to Corvalis, Oregon. 
10. Although the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, recommended 
that the children remain in the physical custody of plaintiff, he indicated in 
his report that it would be in the children's best interests to remain in Utah 
and reading his report as a whole, it is clear that the recommendation was a 
close call. The present custodial arrangements have fostered happy well-
adjusted lives for the children. 
11. Although there are no defects in plaintiffs capacity or 
willingness to function as a parent, there is some question about plaintiffs 
stability because of her several changes of residence during the year since the 
entry of the decree of divorce herein. 
12. Both parents have an equal depth of and long term desire for 
custody. The father has shown a commitment to the children. 
13. Defendant would provide personal care for the children by 
reducing the hours that he works and would also be required to provide some 
surrogate care. 
14. During the marriage, both parents and the children attended 
the LDS Church and were active in the LDS Church. Since the separation of 
the parties, plaintiff has ceased to be active in the LDS Church. Defendant 
remains active and wishes to keep the children active in the LDS Church. 
The court finds that it is unlikely that, if the children were to move to 
Corvalis, Oregon, plaintiff would continue their religious training. 
15. The majority of the children's extended family, including 
aunts, uncles, and cousins, are primarily in the state of Utah. Defendant's 
children from his prior marriage, half-sister and half-brother to these 
children, also live in Utah. These children have an excellent relationship 
with their older half-sister and half-brother. They have many friends and 
connections in Utah. 
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16. A move to Corvalis, Oregon, is not in the children's best 
interests; it is in the best interests of the children to remain in Summit 
County, Utah. If plaintiff wishes to continue to reside in Summit County, the 
children will remain primarily in her physical custody. If, however, plaintiff 
determines to move to Corvalis, Oregon, primary physical custody of the 
children should be transferred to defendant and plaintiff should have liberal 
visitation. 
17. Plaintiff did not keep defendant informed of the development 
of her plans to move and has not kept defendant fully advised of the 
children's activities in school. Each party should be admonished to keep the 
other fully informed about the children's activities and welfare. 
18. Plaintiff has not shown a need for assistance with payment of 
her attorney's fees. 
(R. 213-215). 
The court found that the parties should continue in their joint legal custody of the 
children, and that primary physical custody would remain with Alicia, unless she moves 
from Summit County, Utah. In that case, physical custody of the children would be 
transferred to Marc, subject to Alicia's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. Each party 
was ordered to bear his or her own attorney's fees and costs. (R. 216). An order modifying 
the decree of divorce was subsequently entered consistent with the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. (R. 283, 284). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the decree of divorce 
to transfer physical custody of the parties' three minor children from Alicia to Marc if she 
moves to Corvalis, Oregon. The evidence supports the court's findings of fact, and Alicia 
has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the findings. 
II. The trial did not err in considering the likelihood that Alicia would stop the 
children's church attendance as a factor in determining the children's best interests. One of 
the factors which the court properly may take into account in determining the custody is the 
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custodial parent's religious compatibility with the children. The court may also properly 
consider the impact on the children's stability, consistency, and continuity of a potential 
change in their religious upbringing. 
III. The trial court did not weigh the desires and best interests of Marc rather than 
those of the parties' minor children in transferring physical custody to Marc in the event of 
Alicia's relocation to Corvalis, Oregon. The court's primary concern was the best interests 
of the children. Inappropriate weight was not given to Marc's or Alicia's desires; rather the 
court determined that maintaining a stable, consistent environment and a close relationship 
with both parents was in the children's best interests. 
IV. The trial court did not err in failing to award Alicia her attorney's fees and 
costs since she failed to establish she needed assistance in the payment of her attorney's fees 
and costs. 
V. Alicia is not entitled to be awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
connection with this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO TRANSFER 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' THREE MINOR 
CHILDREN FROM ALICIA TO MARC IF SHE MOVED TO 
CORVALIS, OREGON. 
A. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Clearly Supported by the 
Evidence. 
As Alicia points out, a party challenging the trial court's findings of fact has the 
burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the findings and then establishing that, 
despite such evidence, the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight 
of the evidence. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). A trial court's decision 
about custody will not be upset absent a showing of an abuse of discretion or manifest 
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injustice. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 
P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989). In her brief, Alicia reargues the evidence, but does not 
marshal the evidence in support of the court's findings. Alicia attacks the following 
findings of fact: 
1. Parental Bond with Children. Alicia asserts that the evidence does not 
support the court's finding with respect to the children's bonds with their parents. The court 
found: 
While the mother has been the primary caregiver, which I find is true, 
the children are nearly equally bonded to both parents. 
The father has had a significant, active, open involvement in the lives 
of the children.. . . 
The children have, during what I might call the tender years, been 
primarily in the care of their mother. Naturally, they would be expected to be 
very close to their mother but in this case we have a uniquely interested 
father. We have someone who is extremely committed to these children, who 
has previously encountered the experience of being separated from children 
of a prior marriage, and whose wife of the former marriage has even stated 
that he has gone to extraordinary steps to retain a healthy relationship with 
those children. 
(T. 233). The evidence presented amply supports this finding. The evaluator found that the 
children were slightly more closely bonded to their mother, but the differences were 
minimal. (T. 125). He stated that he was ambivalent about choosing the best placement for 
the children. (T. 128). He found that both parents have a positive relationship with the 
children and all three of the children have a positive relationship with both parents. (T. 
120). 
There was also ample evidence of Marc's continuing commitment to his children and 
his desire to be involved in their lives. (Exhibit 6, p. 17). When Marc was with the children, 
he put a lot of effort into parenting them. (T. 129). Every one of the collateral sources 
contacted by the evaluator stated that Marc was a good father. (T. 134). Marc followed the 
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visitation schedule set forth in the decree of divorce and took every opportunity for 
additional visitation. (T. 14, 135). 
Marc's petition to modify sought to prevent Alicia from relocating the children to 
Corvalis and to continue the present child custody and visitation arrangement. If Alicia 
decided to relocate, Marc requested that the court order a change in custody awarding him 
primary physical custody of the children. (R. 76-79). Marc testified, and the court found, 
that he is now in a position to take more time off and devote that additional time to the 
children, which is what he intends to do. (T. 45, 46). 
2. Education and Career Enhancement. Alicia also attacks the court's finding 
that: 
[I]t is speculative whether a move to Corvalis, Oregon would be successful or 
permanent. In the summer of 1992, plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who 
lives in Corvalis, Oregon, and plaintiff indicated that she and Mr. Pomeroy 
intend to marry. However, Mr. Pomeroy and plaintiff have not yet married 
and there is a potential for conflict if the family were to move in with Mr. 
Pomeroy. Nothing about the move to Corvalis, Oregon would enhance the 
children's educational environment, nor plaintiffs career potential. It is a 
high risk move for plaintiff and the children. 
(R. 214). The evidence clearly supports this finding by the court. Alicia testified that she 
planned to marry Pomeroy and move to Corvalis, Oregon. (T. 72, 170). However, there 
was a question as to when this event would occur. Alicia testified that originally a wedding 
date was set for some time in June 1992, but due to a conflict with Marc's brother's 
wedding, the date was moved to January 1993. (T. 72, 82, 157, 170). Later, Alicia again 
moved the wedding date to some time in June 1993. (T. 72). Alicia had met Pomeroy in 
June 1992, spent only two weeks with Pomeroy in Oregon at that time, and decided to marry 
in October of that same year. 
There was also substantial evidence of the potential for conflict if the family were to 
move in with Pomeroy. The evaluator stated that Pomeroy had a positive relationship with 
the children, but, it was still in the developmental stages. (T. 121). At age 40, Pomeroy 
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does not have any children of his own. He testified that he was apprehensive because he 
was new at parenting. (T. 176). The evaluator recommended that custody, if Alicia moved 
to Corvalis, be contingent upon Alicia and Pomeroy marrying because living together 
without marriage would be too disruptive and confusing to the children. (T. 131,132). 
The evidence also raised questions concerning Pomeroy's financial stability. 
(T. 169, 171, 175, 176). Pomeroy testified that his earning level was somewhere around 
$25,000 to $35,000 per year. However, his past yearly taxable income totals $15,000 to 
$25,000. (T. 146,177; Exhibit 6, p. 5). 
There is no evidence that the move to Corvalis would in any way enhance the 
children's education. No competent evidence was offered showing that the schools are 
better in Corvalis. Alicia provided no information to Marc about the quality of the schools 
in Corvalis or about her intentions to place the children in any particular school. (T. 27, 
144, 141, 212, 213). It is questionable whether Alicia would ask for Marc's input in 
deciding which school the children would attend. 
Except for her own opinion, Alicia offered no evidence that the move would enhance 
her career opportunities. Alicia and other witnesses testified that Corvalis was the center for 
glass fusion; the "mecca" in this field of art. (T. 69, 168, 198). She claimed that she 
thought she would be able to establish herself in the field if she lived in this area, yet she and 
other witnesses testified that glass fusion is a new trend in the field of glass artistry. (T. 177, 
200, 201). One of Alicia's witnesses testified that she knew of very few professionals in this 
area of glass work. She personally knew of only two artists who are able to make a living in 
the field. (T. 201). According to the witness, in order to develop a career in this area, a lot 
of traveling is required. Glass fusion is an art form which must be sold in galleries and 
transported to art shows. (T. 210, 203, 204). In addition, Pomeroy who has worked full-
time in this area for twelve years earns a yearly income of only $15,000 to $25,000. The 
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evidence shows that it is unlikely that Alicia could make sufficient income to support 
herself. 
3. Children's Desires. Alicia also attacks the court's finding that "[t]he children 
do not wish to move to Corvalis, Oregon." (R. 215). The evidence supports this finding. 
Since Alicia decided to relocate, all three of the children became more anxious and 
expressed a number of concerns about leaving their school and friends. (Exhibit 6, p. 16). 
Two ofthe three children stated to the evaluator that they would like to see their father more 
often than the move would allow. (T. 124). The evaluator found that the children were 
concerned about being separated from their father. (T. 134). None ofthe children expressed 
a preference to live with either parent in particular. (T. 124). The evidence also shows that 
the children had been working through their feelings about the move and seemed to be 
accepting it but still had some ambivalence about the move. (T. 122; Exhibit 6, p. 16). 
4. Best Interests of the Children. Alicia claims that the evidence also does not 
support the court's finding that: 
Although the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, recommended that the 
children remain in the physical custody of plaintiff, he indicated in his report 
that it would be in the children's best interests to remain in Utah and reading 
his report as a whole, it is clear that the recommendation was a close call. 
The present custodial arrangements have fostered happy well-adjusted lives 
for the children. 
(R. 215). There was substantial evidence that it is in the children's best interests to remain 
in Park City. The evaluator testified that he was ambivalent about Alicia moving to 
Corvalis and removing the children from close and regular contact with their father. (T. 
132, 133). He found that it would be better for the children to reside in Park City, where 
they have always lived, with access to both parents. (T. 128, 137, 138, 142). He stated that 
it would be disruptive for the children to leave their father. Therefore, according to the 
evaluator, the best situation for the children would be to continue to reside in Park City with 
Alicia as their primary physical caregiver. (T. 143, 144, 124,125; Exhibit 6, p. 18). 
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The recommendation of the evaluator was a close call for him. He stated he was 
ambivalent about choosing the best placement of the children and did so after being 
pressured to make a decision. (T. 128, 125). The children would be just as well off, loved 
and cared for with either parent as their primary physical caretaker. 
5. Stability of Alicia. Alicia also argues with the court's finding that: 
Although there are no defects in plaintiffs capacity or willingness to 
function as a parent, there is some question about plaintiffs stability because 
of her several changes of residence during the year since the entry of the 
decree of divorce herein. 
(R. 215). There is substantial evidence to support the court's concerns about Alicia's 
stability. Alicia was awarded the marital home in the decree of divorce with the intent that a 
stable home be made available for the children. (R. 60, 69). Shortly after the divorce, 
Alicia decided to rent the marital home out and to rent a condominium for herself and the 
children in Park City. She did so for financial reasons. (T. 15,17, 77). Her plans to rent the 
first condominium fell through, at which point she rented a second condominium. (T. 77-
79, R. 145). After living in this condominium for two months, Alicia moved the family 
once more into a house located on Kingsford Avenue. (T. 17, 80). 
Alicia initially intended to work out of her home as a stained glass artist; she later 
changed her plans and intended to open a studio, and still later abandoned that plan. In 
October, Alicia informed Marc that she planned on moving to Corvalis in November to 
marry Pomeroy and be a fused glass artist. (T. 19,160, Exhibit 8). Alicia changed her plans 
to move from November 1992 to June 1993. (T. 82, 83, Exhibit 6, p.17). Later, she 
changed her plans stating she would remain in Park City for an indefinite period of time. (T. 
167). Alicia's several changes in residence and career direction within a few months show 
instability in her life. 
6. Desire for Custody. Alicia also challenged the court's finding: "Both 
parents have an equal depth of and long term desire for custody. The father has shown a 
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commitment to the children." (R. 215). The evidence supports this finding. Marc testified 
that he had not been in a position to seek physical custody of the children in the past due to 
his heavy work schedule. However, he had developed his business to the point where he 
was able to leave the work in the hands of capable people for extended periods of time. 
(T. 12, 45, 46). Marc testified that he intended to cut back his work hours and spend more 
time with his children. (T. 9-12). The evaluator found that Marc wanted very deeply to 
have joint physical custody and to maintain a major role in the children's lives. (Exhibit 6, 
p. 17). He also found that Marc has the ability and intent to spend more time with the 
children. (T. 127). Marc testified that he has followed the visitation schedule in the decree 
of divorce and has taken advantage of other opportunities to visit with his children. (T. 42, 
91, 92; Exhibit 6, p. 2). Marc has taken care of the children while Alicia was out of town. 
(T. 30, 78). He also visited once a week with each child at her school for lunch. (T. 14, 32, 
91). 
It is clear from the evidence that the parents have an equal depth of and long term 
desire for custody of the children. 
7. Religion. Alicia contends that the evidence does not support the court's 
finding that: "Defendant remains active and wishes to keep the children active in the LDS 
Church. The court finds that it is unlikely that, if the children were to move to Corvalis, 
Oregon, plaintiff would continue their religious training." (R. 215). There is ample 
evidence to support this finding. Alicia testified that after the divorce she stopped going to 
church and stopped following any tenets of the LDS Church. (T. 150). She did allow Marc 
to continue taking the children to church with him. (T. 96, 141, 149, 150). Alicia testified 
that she investigated the LDS Church in Corvalis and said she would attend church with the 
children. (T. 150, 151). Yet she indicated that, in Oregon, she wished to expose the 
children to a variety of other religions. (T. 141). 
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Both Marc and the evaluator expressed concerns about this new and conflicting 
exposure for the children. The evaluator also expressed concerns about the children's 
religious upbringing because of their young ages. (T. 140, 141). The children are in their 
formative years. Continuity in their lives is important. The evaluator stated that Marc's 
lifestyle in this respect is more compatible with the way the children have been raised. 
(T. 141). 
There is ample evidence to support each of the specific findings of the court attacked 
by Alicia; Alicia simply fails to acknowledge it. She has not carried her burden to marshal 
the evidence supporting the findings. Unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous 
in a change of custody dispute, they will not be set aside on appeal. Maughan, 770 P.2d at 
159. 
B. The Trial Court Pid Not Abuse its Piseretion in Requiring a Change m 
Physical Custody in the Event that Alicia moves to CorvaliSi Oregon. 
In part LB of her brief, Alicia argues that the substantial weight of the evidence 
supports continuation of the original order with respect to custody. However, the substantial 
weight of the evidence is not the appropriate test to apply in reviewing a trial court's 
decision in a change of custody matter. As the court indicated in Maughan v. Maughan, 770 
P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989) and Crouse v. Grouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991), a trial 
court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Alicia has 
attacked some of the trial court's findings of fact, but has failed to show that they are clearly 
erroneous. Likewise, as indicated previously, she has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the findings are 
clearly lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Further, Alicia has ignored the fact that the original award of custody pursuant to the 
decree of divorce in this case was for joint legal custody. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
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10.2 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.3, a court has the power to make certain orders with 
respect to the terms of joint custody. Specifically, as it applies in this case, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 30-3-10.3(2)(a) provides that: 
An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the court 
determines appropriate, which may include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by 
further order of the court, or the custodian who has the sole legal right 
to determine the residence of the child;. . . 
Thus, the Utah Legislature specifically contemplated that an order with respect to joint legal 
custody might need to include provisions specifying the residence of the child. The trial 
court in this case properly entered such an order. 
Likewise, Alicia assumes that, as primary physical custodian of the children, she 
ought automatically to have the right to determine where the children will live, based solely 
on her desires. She made the decision to move to Corvalis without consulting Marc, she 
took the children to therapy to change their feelings about the move without involving Marc, 
and apparently did not even intend to engage in the mediation contemplated by the divorce 
decree until Marc forced her to. 
The purpose of joint custody is to allow both parents to continue to be involved in 
the children's lives. Although Alicia attempted to ignore the mandates and benefits of joint 
custody, the trial court properly did not do so. 
Alicia attempts to extract some of the factors that the Utah courts have indicated may 
be considered in a custody dispute, and to apply those factors as she perceives they support 
an award of custody to her. However, this argument misses the mark. Alicia does not argue 
that the trial court ignored these factors, she simply disagrees with the trial court's result. 
Some of the factors which the court must consider in child custody cases are set forth 
in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) and codified in UTAH CODE ANN. 
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§ 30-3-10. The statute requires the court to consider the best interests of the children and the 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. In this case, the trial 
court did consider the requisite factors. For that reason, its decision should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER ALICIA'S 
PERSONAL RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS A FACTOR IN 
DETERMINING THE CHILD CUSTODY PLACEMENT OF 
THE PARTIES' CHILDREN. 
Alicia argues that the trial court improperly considered her personal religious beliefs 
in determining that the children ought to remain in Summit County, Utah. This argument is 
a distortion of the trial court's findings. The trial court found: 
During the marriage, both parents and the children attended the LDS 
Church and were active in the LDS Church. t the separation of the 
parties, plaintiff has ceased to be active in tw LDS Church. Defendant 
remains active and wishes to keep the children active in the LDS Church. 
The court finds that it is unlikely that, if the children were to move to 
Corvalis, Oregon, plaintiff would continue their religious training. 
(R.215). 
This finding does not constitute an attempt on the trial court's part to dictate Alicia's 
religion. Rather, it reflects a concern with respect to the children's stability. The children 
have been raised in the LDS Church to this point, and the trial court found that Alicia would, 
if allowed to move to Corvalis, probably deprive them of their activity in the church. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a court may consider religious compatibility 
in determining custody. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41. That is exactly what the trial court did 
in this case. The trial court properly considered how Alicia would raise the children in 
Corvalis compared with how they have been raised in the past. The evaluator testified that 
there were indirect indications that Alicia was discouraging the children in their religious 
views. (T. 141). Alicia also told the evaluator that she planned to expose the children to 
different religions in Corvalis. (T. 141). 
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In Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1993), the parents were awarded joint 
legal custody of their sons, with the mother retaining physical custody. Shortly after the 
divorce, the mother stated her intention to marry and move to a different state and the father 
filed a petition to modify. The trial court awarded physical custody to the father. Although 
the court found that the parents were nearly equal in all respects, the deciding factor was the 
mother's lack of religion. The Supreme Court of Idaho held the trial court had improperly 
ruled that, because the mother decided not to observe a certain religious faith, her custodial 
rights would be jeopardized. 
This case is entirely different. The trial court did not consider Alicia's personal 
religious views; rather, it concerned itself with Alicia's intent to expose the children to 
different religions in Corvalis. To do so would involve one more change in the lives of 
these young, impressionable children during an already turbulent period in their lives. The 
issue for the trial court was continuity and stability in the raising of the children. The court 
did not order Alicia to attend a particular church or to remain LDS. In fact, if the children 
remain in Park City with Alicia, the court expressed no concern with what religious views 
Alicia chooses for herself. In Park City, Marc is present and can continue taking the 
children to the church which they have always attended. (T. 21, 141, 149, 150). Further, the 
trial court's finding that Alicia would stop the children's accustomed religious activity was 
only one of the factors the court considered. Alicia has not attempted to argue that the trial 
court's decision would have been different if it had not considered the fact that Alicia was 
likely to change the children's religious affiliation. 
The court's finding does not violate the United States or Utah Constitutions. The 
finding does not interfere with Alicia's is free exercise of religion nor does it penalize her 
for a lack of religious affiliation. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT WEIGH THE DESIRES AND 
BEST INTERESTS OF MARC RATHER THAN THOSE OF 
THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN IN TRANSFERRING 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY TO MARC IN THE EVENT OF 
ALICIA'S MOVE TO OREGON. 
Alicia argues that the trial court improperly weighed Marc's desires and best 
interests, rather than those of the children, in determining that physical custody of the 
children should change in the event of Alicia's move. This argument misstates the trial 
court's entire ruling. What the trial court did find is that the children are better off living in 
Park City with both parents. The ideal situation, according to the evaluator and the trial 
court, would be for both parents to remain in Park City with the children. However, in the 
event that Alicia determined to leave Park City, the trial court found that it was in the 
children's best interests to remain in Park City with their father. In effect, the trial court put 
the children's best interests before Alicia's desires. 
Clearly, a change in circumstances would take place if Alicia moved to Corvalis, 
Oregon with the children. Not only would the children be uprooted from their normal 
environment, obviously they could not have the same visitation with their father to which 
they are accustomed. In Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah App. 1992), the court said: 
We recognize that an award of custody can be predicated upon 
requiring the custodial parent to keep the children within this jurisdiction. 
See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 204; 321 P.2d 939, 943 (1958) ("plaintiff 
should be required to retain the children in this jurisdiction until the further 
order of this court so that the defendant may enjoy the full privileges of 
visiting and maintaining the best possible paternal relationship with them"). 
It is not just Marc's preference to maintain a close, loving relationship with his children; it is 
also in the children's best interests. 
In Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993), the court said that it should examine 
the motives of a custodial parent in seeking to move to a location different from that where 
the noncustodial parent is living. In this case, the custodial parent's motives are suspect. 
She decided to marry Doug Pomeroy based on a very short acquaintance, she had decided to 
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change her career direction and residence several times in the few months following the 
divorce, and the move to Corvalis would have constituted yet another change. The custody 
evaluator also found that one motive for Alicia's move might be to limit Marc's contact with 
the children. She had not given Marc any information regarding the schools in Corvalis, nor 
was he allowed to be involved in counseling that Alicia arranged for the children to help 
them deal with their feelings about the move to Corvalis. (T. 212,213; Exhibit 6, p. 16). 
In several jurisdictions, there is a presumption against removal of children. For 
example, in Nevada, NEVADA REVISED STATUTE 125A350 so provides. In Schwartz v. 
Schwartz, 812 P.2d 1268,1270 (Nev. 1991), the court found that the purpose of the statute is 
to preserve the rights and familial relationship of the noncustodial parent with the child. 
New York also has a general rule against relocation. Ladizhensky v. Ladizhensky, 
585 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (A.D.2Dept. 1992). Likewise, the North Carolina court has 
recognized the adverse effects of such a move. In Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 
675, 680 (N.C.App. 1992), "it will be a rare case where the child will not be adversely 
affected when a relocation of a custodial parent and child requires substantial alteration of a 
successful custodial-visitation arrangement in which both parents have substantial contact 
with the child." See also McAlister v. Patterson, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1982) (citing Koon v. 
Koon, 203 S.C. 556, 28 S.E.2d 89 (1943); King v. King, 202 Ga. 838, 44 S.E.2d 791 (1947); 
In re De Ford, 226 N.C. 189, 37 S.E.2d 516 (1946); Pugh v. Pugh, 133 W.Va. 501, 56 
S.E.2d 901 (1949)). 
In this case, the court clearly put the children's best interests before the personal 
desires of either Alicia or Marc. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
AWARD ALICIA ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE PETITION TO MODIFY. 
In determining whether to award attorney's fees in connection with a petition to 
modify, the court must consider the following factors: 
(1) the receiving spouse's need for attorney's fees; 
(2) the ability of the other spouse to pay; and 
(3) the reasonableness of the fees. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993). In this case, Alicia failed to establish a 
need for payment of her fees. Alicia receives income by way of alimony and child support 
in the amount of $5,400 per month. In addition, she was expected to receive a large 
property settlement from Marc. Thus, the trial did court did not abuse its discretion in 
failing to determining that she needed assistance with her attorney's fees. 
V. ALICIA SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPEAL. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a party who is successful on appeal and 
who is entitled to attorney's fees in the court below may also be awarded attorney's fees on 
appeal. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d at 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991). As indicated previously, 
Alicia did not show a need for an award of attorney's fees at the trial level and, therefore, 
should not be awarded the fees incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in finding that the best interests of the Larson children 
required maintaining the status quo. Clearly, the evidence supported the finding that the 
father's close and loving relationship with the children ought to be encouraged and fostered 
and that the proposed move to Corvalis might well be inimical to the maintenance of a stable 
environment for the children. Since the entry of the decree, Alicia had moved, changed 
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career directions, changed religions, and formed a new relationship. It was entirely 
appropriate for the court to find that the children's best interests would not be served by the 
move. 
Likewise, the trial court did not err in considering the likelihood that the children's 
mother would not continue their affiliation with the LDS Church. In doing so, the court is 
not expressing a preference for a particular religion, or even religion generally. Rather, the 
trial court was noting that the proposed move would likely disrupt all aspects of the 
children's normal, customary lifestyle, including their involvement with their church and 
community. 
Further, the trial court did not err in refusing to award attorney's fees to Alicia. She 
did not prevail at trial nor did she demonstrate a need for assistance. Likewise, fees should 
not be awarded on appeal. 
The order of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 27th day of June, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Determinative Statutes: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-5, 30-3-10, 30-3-10.2, 30-3-
10.3,30-3-10.4 (Supp. 1993) 
2. Decree of Divorce entered April 29,1992 
3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered July 26,1993 
4. Order Modifying Decree of Divorce entered July 26,1993 
5. Custody Evaluation filed January 13,1993 
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Tabl 
D1VUKCE 30-3-5 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990. 
104, $§ 2 to 5. providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Division of debts 
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meri-
torious petition for modification [Effective until 
January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
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the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony tha t the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorney s fees expended by the prevailing party in tha t action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order 
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12 2 where a visitation right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party s failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation 
Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony 
— Nonmeritorious petition for modification [Ef-
fective January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties 
The court shall include the following m every decree of divorce 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children, 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children, 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6 5 
d) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage, 
(n) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses, and 
(m) provisions for the enforcement of these orders, 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5, and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order assess-
ing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing fee to 
be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery 
Services within the Department of Human Services for the purposes of 
income withholc 
and 5 
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(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order 
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, * 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, t 3; 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
13, * 1; 1985, ch. 72, * 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 
1991, ch. 257, * 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, 
ch. 261, § 1. 
Amended effective January 1, 1994. — 
Laws 1993, ch 261, ^ 1 amends this section 
effective January 1, 1994 See the amendment 
note below 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991. inserted "debts 
or obligations in the introductory paragraph 
of Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and 
inserted and obligations for debts' near the 
end of Subsection (3) 
The 1993 amendment by ch 152, effective 
May 3 1993, substituted ' members of the im-
mediate family" for relatives" and "best inter-
est" for welfare" in Subsection (4), substituted 
f
 shall" for ' may' and inserted 'or defended 
against" in Subsection (7), added Subsection 
(8) and made stvlistic changes 
The 1993 amendment by ch 261 effective 
January 1, 1994, inserted f or becomes' in Sub-
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(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered bv the clerk in the 
register of actions if both the parties who have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2 1 where the pilot program is administered and have completed 
attendance at the mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11 3 except 
if the court waives the requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of 
one of the parties, upon determination that course attendance and com-
pletion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the best interest of 
the parties, 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may specifically desig-
nate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending, or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for sufficient 
cause otherwise orders 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown, 
may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree 
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from the signing and entry of 
the decree 
History. L. 1909, ch. 109, § 2; 1913, ch. 49, 
* 1; C.L. 1917, § 3002; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
40-3-7, L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1, 1969, ch. 72, § 5; 
1985, ch. 33, * 1; 1992, ch. 98, § 2 
Amendment Notes — The 1992 amend 
ment effective April 27 1992 added the sub 
section designations and made related stylistic 
changes and in Subsection (l)(a) added the 
language at the end of the subsection begin 
mng with if both the parties who have a child 
or children 
30-3-8, Remarriage — When unlawful. 
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Cited in Van Der Stappen v Van Der 
Stappen 815 P 2d 1335 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or di-
vorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their 
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the 
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate In 
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties 
The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the chil-
dren's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not 
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act m the best interests of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or 
has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall 
263 
take that evidence mto consideration m determining whether to award cus-
tody to the other parent 
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, k 1; C.L. 1907, 
** 1212x; C.L. 1917, * 3004; R.S. 1933 & C 
1943, 40-3-10, L. 1969, ch. 72, k 7; 1977, ch. 
122, * 5; 1988. ch 106, * 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1 
Amendment Notes — The 1993 amend 
ment effective Ma\ 3 1993 added Subsection 
(3) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Award proper 
Change of custodv 
— Burden of proof 
Children s choice 
Custodv evaluation reports 
Factors in determining best interests of child 
— Moral character 
—Sexual abuse 
Findings required 
Inadequate findings 
Jurisdiction 
Modification 
Primarv caretaker 
Cited 
Award proper. 
Award of custodv of three children, ages 14 
8 and 6 to the father was affirmed, where both 
parents were found to be well qualified for cus 
tody but the oldest child wished to live with 
the father and the vounger children wished to 
remain with their older sibling Moon v Moon, 
790 P2d 52 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
Change of custody. 
In change-of-custodv cases involving a 
nonhtigated custody decree, a trial court, in 
applying the changed-circumstances test, 
should receive evidence on changed circum-
stances and that evidence may include evi-
dence that pertains to the best interests of the 
child In ruling the tnal court should give sta-
bility and continuity the weight that is appro-
priate in light of the duration of the existing 
custodial relationship and the general welfare 
of the child The findings of fact should show 
that the court considered stability as a factor 
in the custodv decision and indicate the weight 
the court gave it Elmer v Elmer, 776 P 2d 599 
(Utah 1989) 
Courts should exercise caution in disturbing 
custody awards during the early reconstructive 
months after a divorce It is ordinarily best to 
let the dust settle for a time, lest temporary 
factors incident to readjustment be mistaken 
for material changes Thorpe v Jensen, 817 
P2d 387 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
Circumstances of the noncustodial parent or 
dmarilv do not bear upon the issue of whether 
a change of custody is appropriate Such fac-
tors, aside from exceptional circumstances are 
not relevant to the courts inquirv Thorpe v 
Jensen 817 P 2d 387 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
The fact that the mother had been generous 
in sharing physical custodv with the father 
was not a ground to change phvsical custody, if 
anvthing it supported leaving primary physi-
cal custody with the mother as it showed that 
she had lived up to the responsibilities of a 
custodial parent Crouse v Crouse, 817 P 2d 
836 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
The fact that the children have started 
school does not indicate a substantial change 
in circumstances because only changes not con-
templated by the parties at the time of divorce 
are relevant to the substantial change test 
Crouse v Crouse, 817 P 2d 836 (Utah Ct App 
1991) 
—Burden of proof. 
The burden of proof lies with the party seek-
ing the change of custody That partv must 
first show that there has been a change in cir-
cumstances upon which the original custody 
award was based that materially affects the 
custodial parents parenting abihtv or the 
functioning of the custodial relationship and 
that justifies reopening the custody question. If 
a substantial change of circumstances can be 
shown, the party must then show that the re-
quested change is in the best interest of the 
children Thorpe v Jensen 817 P 2d 387 (Utah 
Ct App 1991) 
Children's choice. 
During the course of trial on a noncustodial 
parent s petition for modification of a divorce 
decree seeking permanent custodv of the chil-
dren it was inappropriate for the court to place 
as much reliance as it did on an eleven-year-
old boy s statement (made to the judge alone in 
chambers without counsel present) that he pre-
ferred to live with his father the petitioner 
Cummings v Cummings 175 Utah Adv Rep. 
23 (Ct App 1991; 
Custody evaluation reports. 
Rule 4-903(2), Utah Code of Judicial Admin-
istration, permits an evaluator to submit a 
written report to the court, thereby contem-
plating the use of such a report by a trial court 
in child custodv determinations Linam v 
King, 804 P 2d 1235 (Utah Ct App 1991). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments — Fam-
ily Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 363. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Utah 
Task Force on Gender And Justice: Report to 
the Utah Judicial Council. March 1990, 16 J. 
Contemp. L. 135 (1990). 
A.L.R. — Separating children by custody 
awards to different parents — post-1975 cases, 
67 A.L.R.4th 354. 
When does state that issued previous cus-
tody determination have continuing jurisdic-
tion under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act (UCCJA) or Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA). 28 USCS § 1738A. 83 
A.L.R.4th 742. 
Child custody and visitation rights of person 
infected with AIDS, 86 A.L.R.4th 211. 
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
modification of t 
through litigatio: 
protect the chile 
History: C. 1953. 
1988, ch. 106, § 3; 
Amendment Not 
ment, effective Marc 
Subsection (1), which 
ble presumption, sub 
joint legal custody I 
child." and redesign; 
tions accordingly: re 
in Subsection (2), ins 
Utah L a w Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Statutory Enactments — Fam-
ily Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 363. 
30-3-10.2. Joint legal custody order — Factors for court 
determination — Public assistance. 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that joint legal 
custody is in the best interest of the child and: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or 
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by 
ordering joint custody, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and de-
velopment of the child will benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the 
child and reach shared decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a posi-
tive relationship between the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the 
divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capac-
ity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal 
custody; 
(g) the maturi ty of the parents and their willingness and ability to 
protect the child from conflict that may arise between the parents: and 
(h) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint custody may 
preclude eligibility for public assistance in the form of aid to families with 
dependent children, and that if public assistance is required for the support of 
children of the parties at any time subsequent to an order of joint legal cus-
tody, the order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4. 
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle 
future disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or 
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modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody 
through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to 
protect the child. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.2, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 106, § 3; 1990, ch. 112, § 1. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective March 8. 1990, deleted former 
Subsection (1), which read "There is a rebutta-
ble presumption, subject to Subsection (2), that 
joint legal custody is in the best interest of a 
child," and redesignated the following subsec-
tions accordingly: restructured Subsection (1); 
in Subsection (2), inserted "whether" and "will 
be served by ordering joint custody" in the in-
troductory language, substituted "divorce" for 
"filing of the suit" in Subsection (d), rewrote 
Subsection (f), which had read "if the child is 
12 years of age or older, any preference of the 
child for or against joint legal custody," added 
Subsection (g) and made related changes; and 
substituted "order" for "recommend" in Subsec-
tion (5). 
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Construction and application. 
The 1990 amendment of this section did not 
make a mere procedural change or simply clar-
ify how the 1988 statute should have been un-
derstood originally. The amendment was sub-
stantial and substantive; thus, retroactive ap-
plication is not appropriate. Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Parental rights of man who is not 
biological or adoptive father of child but was 
husband or cohabitant of mother when child 
was conceived or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655. 
Child custody and visitation rights of person 
infected with AIDS, 86 A.L.R.4th 211. 
30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order. 
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of joint legal 
custody is entered when the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district 
as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is administered as 
provided under Section 30-3-11.3, both parties shall attend the mandatory 
course and present a certificate of completion from the course to the court. 
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the court determines 
appropriate, which may include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by further 
order of the court, or the custodian who has the sole legal right to deter-
mine the residence of the child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, 
education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before 
making decisions concerning any of these areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present 
and future physical care, support, and education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's attendance at school 
and other activities, his daily routine, and his association with friends; 
and 
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental rights, privileges, duties, and 
powers to be exercised by the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly. 
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the terms agreed to 
between the parties. 
267 
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by the court order may be 
exercised by the parent having physical custody of the child the majority of 
the time. 
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians does not impair or limit 
the authority of the court to order support of the child, including pay-
ments by one custodian to the other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not grounds for modify-
ing a support order. 
(c) The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the par-
ties agree to use before seeking enforcement or modification of the terms 
and conditions of the order of joint legal custody through litigation, except 
in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.3, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 106, § 4; 1992, ch. 98, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (1), redesignated former Subsections (1) 
through (5) as Subsections (2), (3), (4), (5)(a), 
and (5)(c). and added a comma in Subsection 
(2)(e). 
30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may, 
after a hearing, modify an order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have mate-
rially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modi-
fied, or the order has become unworkable or inappropriate under existing 
circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be an 
improvement for and in the best interest of the child. 
(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be terminated by order of the court 
if both parents file a motion for termination. At the time of entry of an order 
terminating joint legal custody, the court shall enter an order of sole legal 
custody under Section 30-3-10. All related issues, including visitation and 
child support, shall also be determined and ordered by the court. 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered 
frivolously and in a manner designed to harass the other party, the court shall 
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending party. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.4, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 106, § 5; 1990, ch. 112, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective March 8, 1990, rewrote the first 
two sentences in Subsection (2), which had 
read "(a) The order of joint legal custody is ter-
minated upon the filing of a motion for termi-
nation by: d) both parents; or (n) one parent, 
when notice of the motion is sent by certified 
mail to the other parent and an affidavit is 
filed with the motion, indicating the motion 
has been mailed as required by this subsection 
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be re-
placed by the court with an order of sole legal 
custody under Section 30-30-10 " 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. 
The 1990 amendment of this section did not 
make a mere procedural change or simply clar-
ify how the 1988 statute should have been un-
derstood originally. The amendment was sub-
stantial and substantive: thus, retroactive ap-
plication is not appropriate Thronson v 
Thronson, 810 P 2d 428 (Utah Ct App ), cert 
denied, 826 P 2d 651 (Utah 1991) 
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8. Household Furniture, Furnishings and Personal 
Effects. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired 
certain items of household furniture and furnishings, personal 
effects and belongings which are hereby awarded between the parties 
as divided, with the plaintiff awarded all such items in her 
possession, and the defendant awarded all such items in his 
possession. 
9. Vehicles. The plaintiff is awarded the Plymouth 
Voyager Van as her separate property subject to the debt owing 
thereon to Zions First National Bank, which she shall assume, pay 
and hold defendant harmless therefrom. The defendant is awarded 
the Kawasaki motorcycle as his separate property. 
10. Real Property. The parties1 interests in real 
property is hereby equitably distributed as follows: 
a. Home. The home and real property located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, commonly known as 128 6 Moray Court in 
Park City, Utah, is awarded to the plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property free and clear of any interest of the defendant, 
subject to the mortgages owing to Capital City Bank and to Barney 
and Evelyn Saunders, which she shall assume, pay and hold defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
b. Condominium. The condominium commonly known as 
No. 8, Windrift Condominium, located in Park City, Utah, is awarded 
to the defendant as his sole and separate property, free and clear 
of any interest of the plaintiff, subject to the mortgage 
5 
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obligation owing thereon to Draper Bank, which defendant shall 
assume, pay and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
11. IRA Accounts. The IRA account(s) maintained in the 
Franklin US Government Securities Fund are hereby divided equally 
between the parties. 
12. Summit Sports Medicine. During the marriage, the 
defendant established his physical therapy practice now known as 
Summit Sports Medicine. The defendant is awarded all assets of 
Summit Sports Medicine, including equipment, receivables and the 
vehicle associated with Summit Sports Medicine, as his separate 
property, together with all liabilities associated therewith, 
including the taxes, accounts payable and Vail Medical Center and 
Fitness Center notes payable, which shall be defendant's 
responsibilities and he shall assume, pay and hold plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
13. Crystal Images. The plaintiff is awarded all assets 
of her Crystal Images art operation, including equipment, supplies 
and inventory as her separate property subject to any liabilities 
and obligations incurred through Crystal Images, which plaintiff 
shall assume, pay and hold defendant harmless therefrom. 
14. ITT Life Insurance. During the marriage, the 
parties accumulated a cash surrender value in an ITT life insurance 
policy of at least $3,500, which shall be immediately surrendered 
and distributed to the plaintiff as her sole and separate property. 
15. Checking and Savings Accounts. During the course of 
the parties1 marriage, the parties accumulated funds in certain 
6 
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checking and savings accounts. The plaintiff is awarded the 
checking and savings accounts maintained in her separate name as 
her sole and separate property, and the defendant is awarded the 
checking and savings accounts maintained in his separate name and 
in the name of his business as his sole and separate property. 
16. Property Settlement. Plaintiff is awarded judgment 
in her favor and against defendant in the principal sum of $86,500 
to earn interest at the rate of 4% per annum from April 1, 1992, 
until April 1, 1997, at which time this judgment shall be due and 
payable to plaintiff and shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum until fully paid and satisfied. This property settlement 
award and judgment shall be appropriately secured by defendant's 
Summit Sports Medicine assets, accounts, accounts receivable, 
equipment and vehicle, and the security interest shall be 
appropriately perfected. This security interest is subordinate to 
any necessary extension of credit to defendant and Summit Sports 
Medicine for business purposes. 
17. Debts. The parties1 debts and obligations shall be 
distributed and paid as follows: 
a. Plaintiff's Debts. The plaintiff shall assume, 
pay and hold defendant harmless from the home mortgages owing to 
Capital City Bank and the Saunders, the automobile loan owing to 
Zions First National Bank for the Plymouth van and any debts and 
obligations associated with Crystal Images. 
b. Defendant's Debts. The defendant shall assume, 
pay and hold plaintiff harmless from the following debts and 
7 
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obligations: the amount owing to First Interstate Bank on the line 
of credit extended for the purpose of plaintiff's attorneys' fees 
retainer and costs, the automobile loan owing to Zions First 
National Bank for defendant's daughter's automobile, and the 
automobile loan owing to Larry Miller and any and all debts and 
obligations associated with defendant's Summit Sports Medicine 
practice. 
18. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Each party shall assume 
and pay their own attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein. 
19. Mutual Cooperation. Each party shall cooperate with 
the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes in 
titles to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change the 
names of responsible parties for payment upon the charge accounts 
and other debts divided herein, and to cooperate in each and every 
other way necessary or proper to insure that the orders of the 
Court entered are carried out in every detail. 
DATED this J~y day of ^ ^ / ^ ^ , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED: 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
By. r* «/ 
7 . / 
ELLE&F MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Defendant 
't I , \ U±L 
' Dated 
O n n n 4 ^ , 
-* / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the if ' day 
of April, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq, 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
uOi if / /•u 
IRENE H. CLARK 
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ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALICIA LARSON, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
MARC LARSON, 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 10958 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant's petition for modification of decree of divorce came before the court for trial 
on April 15, 1993, the Honorable David S. Young presiding. Plaintiff was present and 
represented by her counsel, John Sheaffer, and defendant was present and represented by his 
counsel, Ellen Maycock. The court heard the testimony of witnesses, received exhibits, and 
heard arguments of counsel. Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing, the court hereby 
makes and enters the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. The decree of divorce in this matter was entered on April 29, 1992. 
2. The decree provided that plaintiff and defendant would have joint legal custody of 
their three minor children, Brandy, April, and Angie. Plaintiff was awarded primary physical 
No. 
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custody and defendant was awarded rights of visitation. The decree further provided that each 
party would cooperate in fostering and maintaining the other party's relationship and parental 
role with the children and that the parties would jointly participate in making decisions 
concerning the children's upbringing. 
3. In October of 1992, plaintiff informed defendant that she intended to move, with 
the three children, to Corvalis, Oregon. 
4. Plaintiff has been the primary caregiver for the parties' minor children, but 
defendant has had a significant, active, open involvement in their lives. Defendant has fulfilled a 
traditional role in the children's lives; that is, he is the bread winner, and plaintiff has been the 
person designated to raise the children. 
5. Notwithstanding that plaintiff has been the primary caregiver, the children are 
nearly equally bonded to both parents. Defendant is extremely committed to his children and 
wishes to continue to be involved in their lives. 
6. Plaintiff and defendant are each excellent parents. Each is equally capable of 
caring for the children. 
7. At best, it is speculative whether a move to Corvalis, Oregon would be successful 
or permanent. In the summer of 1992, plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in Corvalis, 
Oregon, and plaintiff indicated that she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry. However, Mr. 
Pomeroy and plaintiff have not yet married and there is a potential for conflict if the family were 
to move in with Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about the move to Corvalis, Oregon would enhance the 
children's educational environment, nor plaintiffs career potential. It is a high risk move for 
plaintiff and the children. 
000214 
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8. Defendant has exercised all visitation that has been allowed by plaintiff and has 
sought additional visitation. He has been involved in the children's school and has been an 
attentive, caring parent. 
9. The children do not wish to move to Corvalis, Oregon. 
10. Although the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, recommended that the children 
remain in the physical custody of plaintiff, he indicated in his report that it would be in the 
children's best interests to remain in Utah and reading his report as a whole, it is clear that the 
recommendation was a close call. The present custodial arrangements have fostered happy well-
adjusted lives for the children. 
11. Although there are no defects in plaintiffs capacity or willingness to function as a 
parent, there is some question about plaintiffs stability because of her several changes of 
residence during the year since the entry of the decree of divorce herein. 
12. Both parents have an equal depth of and long term desire for custody. The father 
has shown a commitment to the children. 
13. Defendant would provide personal care for the children by reducing the hours that 
he works and would also be required to provide some surrogate care. 
14. During the marriage, both parents and the children attended the LDS Church and 
were active in the LDS Church. Since the separation of the parties, plaintiff has ceased to be 
active in the LDS Church. Defendant remains active and wishes to keep the children active in 
the LDS Church. The court finds that it is unlikely that, if the children were to move to Corvalis, 
Oregon, plaintiff would continue their religious training. 
15. The majority of the children's extended family, including aunts, uncles, and 
cousins, are primarily in the state of Utah. Defendant's children from his prior marriage, half-
sister and half-brother to these children, also live in Utah. These children have an excellent 
OOCfelo" 
relationships with their older half-sister and half-brother. They have many friends and 
connections in Utah. 
16. A move to Corvalis, Oregon is not in the children's best interests; it is in the best 
interests of the children to remain in Summit County, Utah. If plaintiff wishes to continue to 
reside in Summit County, the children will remain primarily in her physical custody. If, 
however, plaintiff determines to move to Corvalis, Oregon, primary physical custody of the 
children should be transferred to defendant and plaintiff should have liberal visitation. 
17. Plaintiff did not keep defendant informed of the development of her plans to 
move, or has not kept defendant fully advised of the children's activities in school. Each party 
should be admonished to keep the other fully informed about the children's activities and welfare. 
18. Plaintiff has not shown a need for assistance with payment of her attorney's fees. 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes and enters the following: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The petition for modification of the decree of divorce should be granted. The 
parties should maintain joint legal custody of their minor children. If plaintiff determines to 
reside in Summit County, Utah, she should retain primary physical custody of the children and 
defendant's visitation shall remain as set forth in the decree of divorce. In the event plaintiff 
decides to move from Summit County, Utah, physical custody of the children should be 
transferred to defendant, and plaintiff should have reasonable and liberal visitation. 
2. Each party should bear his or her own attorney's fees and costs herein. 
00021b 
DATED this fl£day of , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE DAV^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, postage prepaid, on the ^ day of 
June, 1993: 
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Esq. 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -2167 
^ <u^ %HfJU*44*^ 
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ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Eighth Floor. Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALICIA LARSON, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
MARC LARSON, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 10958 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant's petition for modification of decree of divorce came before the court for trial 
on April 15, 1993, pursuant to notice. The Honorable David S. Young presided. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by her counsel, John D. Sheaffer, Jr., and defendant was present and 
represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock. The court having heard the testimony of witnesses, 
received exhibits, heard arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
as follows: 
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1. Defendant's petition for modification of the decree of divorce is granted. The 
parties shall maintain joint legal custody of their minor children. If plaintiff resides in Summit 
County, Utah, she shall retain primary physical custody of the children and defendant's visitation 
shall continue as set forth in the decree of divorce. In the event plaintiff decides to move from 
Summit County, Utah, physical custody of the children shall be transferred to defendant, and 
plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable and liberal visitation. 
2. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs herein. 
DATED this /j^ctey of % * ^ , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following, postage prepaid, on the J£ day of 
June, 1993: 
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Esq. 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
L
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INSULTING SERv «CES 
3ox 18747 Kim Peterson, MSW 
jake City, Utah 84118 License* amcaisociai worker 
965-9511/588-3578 
CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION 
(Confidential} 
Plaintiff: Alicia Larson 
Defendant: Marc Larson 
Case Number: 10958, Summit County Date: 12-26-92 
The plaintiff, Alicia Larson, is a 39-year-old Caucasian 
female who lives in Park City, Utah. The defendant, Marc Larson, 
is a 4i-year-old Caucasian male who also lives in Park City. 
Alicia and Marc were married August 27, 1383 and were 
divorced April, 1992. They have three children, Brandi, age 8 
(DOB: 5-20-84), April age 7 (DOB: 7-26-85), and Angie, age 5 
(DOB: 10-14-86). Alicia and Mark share legal joint custody with 
her home having been designated as the childrenfs primary-
residence. Alicia is currently planning on remarriage and 
relocating in Corvalis, Oregon, and Marc has filed for full 
custody of the children. 
1 1
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Plainti ff: Alicia Larson is the youngest of two 
children. She was raised "everywhere," as 
her father was in the military. Her parents had a stagnant 
marriage, but Alicia reported a good relationship with both 
parents and a happy childhood. She was an above-average student 
and has attended one year of college. 
Alicia denied any history of psychiatric disturbance. She 
denied any alcohol abuse, but during her early twenties, she 
occasionally used marijuana and cocaine. She has never been 
arrested. 
Alicia married her first husband, Gene Wingate, when age 19. 
Ke was considerably older and a rock musician. He was physically' 
abusive, and she became disenchanted with his lifestyle and left ^  
after about one year. She was single for the next ten years, but , 
during her mid-twenties, she lived with a man for approximately 
two years. 
Marc was Alicia's physical therapist, and she was attracted 
to him because he was helpful, caring, and funny, and "I thought 
the time.'' However, after they married, she 
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Larson vs. Larson 
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.m to be entirely 
unaiiectionate. He normaiiy worked nnoil 
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 r anci when he came home, he would oo chart i no o: 
Marc haci his life, and she and 
the *y 1 r 1 s had their lives, anci she found her marriage to be very 
lonely. Alicia said it was almost impossible to engage Marc in 
any m e a m ncif ul conversation. They saw numerous marital 
therdpi st s, and Alicia uiu everythino she 
relationship. However, nothing had any lasting* effect, and their 
relationship continued to deteriorate. Alicia said she often 
made plans to leave, but she stayed, as she did not want to admit 
failure. She said it was like "living with a dead person," and 
she finally ran out of things to distract herself, and eventually 
she found the courage to 1eave. 
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work, he would often become quite involved with the children. 
However, she usually hao to ask Marc to help with the children, 
to have his sleep interrupted. Alicia felt Marc 
u b U d i i y i idu n i ^ n e d u u u n e u i ii Lue bdiiUj 
if the children had symptoms of illness, and his typical response 
was "they'll be fine." If the children misbehaved, he would 
simply "tune it out," and he did not become involved in 
discipline. His relationship with the children has been "fun," 
but he has not been very close to them, and his older daughter 
from a previous niarnaue has said, "you can't really talk to my 
dad." Since tne separation and divorce, Marc has maintained 
regular visitation, ne nas oecome more attentive when he has the 
children, and he has started doing things that he never did 
j j e i u i e , i i - \ e i i e i p i i i y Lneiii W I L U b u u u u i W U L / L . 
In contrast, A1ic i a saw herself as being a "great" parent. 
She ielt she has always provided excellent care, and sh^ has been 
tuned in to the children's emotional and developmental needs. 
She has found parenting to be a very enjoyable experience, and 
: e a 1 1 y t 
human being s. Th e c h i 1 u r e n h ave been her first pr i o r i ty, s he has 
given them a lot of attention, and she spends quality time with 
them. She has spent a lot of time helping the children with 
the i r i nte11ectua1 deve1opment, and she usual 1y he 1ps them wi th 
school work. Alicia felt she was very aware of any problems the 
L i u i u ^ t i n c t i e i i d v i i i u , dii ia :^iie i e n b n e u i u <± u u u u j u u W I L U 
discipline ano guiuance. At times, she wi11 yell 
children, but for tne most part, she remains calm. Alicia ielt 
the children had always been more closely bonded to her. 
Defendant: Marc Larson was raised 
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very ciose no uib lamer, as he v/as deaf, and it was difficult t 
communicate witn i'iiui. As a cniio, llaic was introverted a a a a 
nome body, out ae VMS a gooo student ana became involved in extr 
curricula! activities. Hare is a college graduate. 
Il3.rc denied any specific psychiatric difficulties, out vihen 
he went on a mission j_or tne LDS C nu r c h, h * 
adjusting to being away irom home. During 
they s aw nurner ous marital therapists. Harc denled any 
problems with substance abuse or difficulty with the lav;. 
Marc married his first wife, Pam, when age 21. They 
ive years due to incompatibility, and she wanted 
out. They have two children, Laurie, age 13, and liatthew7, age 
16, who have lived with their mother since the time of the 
U i VUHJfcS . 
Three years alter his divorce, Marc married Alicia after a 
courtship lasting approximately six months. He found her to be 
attractive and intelligent, but they began having problems 
shortly after they got married. There were numerous stressors, 
ana a i i C i d wdb uuiicippy wiLii Lilt* iuag nuui -z> rec ju i iBu j->y n ib 
b u s i n e s s . Th ey ha d d i f f i c u i t y c ommunic a t i n g, and " t h e m o r e she 
me, the less she liked." They grew apart emotionally 
and sexualiy, ana tney nad different interests. There was a lot 
over the way Alicia treated his older children, and 
there was a 1ot of stress from having Alicia's younger step-
brother, wno hao a lot of behavior problems, living with them. 
Later there was also contlict over how they should raise their 
three children. Another area of conflict 17as religion, as Alicia 
was not as devout as he was. When they disagreed, Alicia would 
become overly assertive and would attack him and become verbally 
abusive, and he would withdraw, which made him feel even more 
lonely, and "it was an ugly and vicious cycle." Allele 
talking about divorce for two to three years pr1or to the 
separation, and tne 11: relationship during that time had been more 
1 ike roommates. 
Overall, Marc saw Alicia as being a good parent. She meets 
the children's oasic neeos, is loving, and spends quality time 
with the cniidren. However, she has had numerous weaknesses. 
She was a poor nouseKeeper, and even though she did not work, at 
times, sne recniireo tne services of a maid and a nanny, and she 
began putting the children in child care when they were quite 
young. Marc saiu wnen he returned home from work, Alicia "would 
.at! 'v-'iiiiuien, ci a u but udb d nibLUiy L 
nu at tne cniioren. Marc complained that 
., Alicia turned away from LDS values, and she 
and having men spend the night, which has 
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he has tried very hard not to be a Disneyland daddy, and he has 
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felt he and the children have a close bond. He felt Apr 
hiiii, but Anyie and Brandi are some\vhat 
more bonded to their mother. 
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?1 ain11fi: After separating, April, 1991. 
i n the f a m i 1 y h o m e w I t h t h e c h i 1 d r e n . 
Because of the larger house payment, she moved to a smaller 
thr e e - b e d r o om nome , V7h i ch she rent s , approx imat e 1 y f our months 
ago. Alicia has been receiving' $5,400 per month in alimony anci 
child support, ana in addition, she has been self-employed as a 
stained glass artist and has produced three books. Her seif-
empi oyment i ncome is approximate1y $ 10,000 per year. 
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the younutibt oi lour cnildren. Doug reported a good rilat ionsuip 
With hlS p a r e n t s dlVCi 5. nappy CaliunOOCi. He Was 3.H aV6id.Cjt; 
student dud hdS dt t e u d y u Olle year of c o l l e g e . DOUG was 
previously ruarr i ea for a period of nine years. His wire died of 
Hodgkin's disease in 1391. They did not have any children. Doug 
self-employed as a stained glass artist for the past 
twelve years and earns approximately 3 15,000 per year. He owns a 
f ou r - bedroom home , and h is s t ud i o 
Doug denied any history of psychiatric problems or alcohol abuse 
u s e of in a r i j u a n a prior to 
15 years ago. In 13 74, he was arrested for possession of 
marijuana and was given a fine of 3100.00. 
Ali c i a and Doug felt the i r re1 at i onship was go i ng we 11. 
They have similar interest s, and A11cia descr ibed h im as be ing a 
good communicator. Doug felt he was developing a good 
re1 a11onshi p w11h Alicia's ch i1dren. He said he was a little 
nervous about having children, but he was looking forward to the 
uiid i i enye . 
Alicia felt she had been very 
especially during this past s urnm e r 
year began, weekday v i s i t s were too di srupt i ve, 
weren't getting homework done. The schedule was changed so that 
w e e k e n d s p e r m o n 11 
Marc has been pushing for more and more time with 
and she saw some oi his tactics as quite manipulative, for 
example, having the children call her to ask for more time 
ing 
she denied any intention of wanting to hurt Marc 
children from him, and she felt it was possible for Marc to spend 
'11n her out of state. 
not feel Marc really wants oustody. Sh& felt his 
real motive was to keep her from leaving the state. Alicia said 
she has offered Marc very lenient visitation, primarily during 
the summer months, but this has been unacceptable to Marc, and it 
would require him to use a day care provider, and he does not 
believe in day care. Instead, Marc is d s k i n g f o r t h e m a j o r i t y 
and he does no t seem t o 
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Alicia felt she should retain phys i ca1 oustody, as she has 
jeen the primary care giver, and she believed the children were 
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Pace 5: 
Lie. .by getLing marrieo, sne teiu sue wouiu aiso creaie more 01 
family atmosphere for the children. She ielt she should be 
tue cniioren, as sne was creatine a better 
life LOT them, and she felt the children, in the long run, would 
adjust better by not having to oo back and forth between the two 
homes as frequently as they do now. 
Marc reported that after separating, he 
rented a condom i n i urn, and approx i mat e 1 y one 
year ago, he bought a three-bedroom condominium. He currently 
has his brother and his wife and three children living with hi in 
on a temporary basis while their home is being built. They plan 
on moving shortly after the first of the year. They are 
obviously cramped at this point, and when the children visit, 
th ey sleep w11 h Hare. 
Marc has been self-employed since 1382 as a physical 
, Sunviui t Sports Medi c ine , has offices in 
! i ty and Park City, and h i s year 1y i ncome 1s 3 120,000. 
Marc said that at the time of the divorce, Alicia 
reluctantly agreed to joint legal custody. Marc said at the time 
he knew it wasn't reasonable for him to have physical custody 
because of his work schedule, and he agreed to a very generous 
f i nanc i a 1 sett 1ement based on the be lief that Ali ci a wou1dn' t 
work, wouid stay nome with the children, and would remain in the 
However, she chose to disrupt the chi1dren by 
working and by moving tue enildren from their home, and she new 
jjidiib on luLLiiei uibiuptiiiu until! livtiS oy moving again ano 
separating the children from their father. In addition, she no 
wnich has been 
confusing to the children. 
Marc said that after the separation, he had liberal 
vi s 11a11on wi th 111e cniloren, but since the begi nning of the 
current school year, Alicia has been controlling about any 
visitation outsioe of the set schedule. He no longer takes the 
eh i 1 dren dur i ng the week, but has the ch i 1 dr en an extra \/eekend 
clay once a montn. He nas aiso been going to the cni Idren's 
schoo 1 to have 1 unch wi th them once a week . 
-«• „ / _- i .• r _ _ . J 1 _ 
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addition, ne is active in tne LD3 Church. He has not dated for 
some time and currently has ne social iiie, out 1
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Alicia, and what he would like is joint legal and physical 
custody. Alicia has proposed that he have visitation six weeks 
each summer, plus one to two weekends per month with extra time 
for holidays. Marc felt this arrangement was unacceptable, as he 
wants longer 
more involved in parenting. Marc has proposed that 
1/2 months each year, January through June, and that 
, Alicia could have the children one week in 
February for President's Day vacation, and one week in April for 
Spring break, plus one to two weekends per month. 
with his plan, the children wouldn't require 
any more child care than they currently have, and he would be 
able to work fewer hours during the time the children were with 
has talked to school officials, and even though 
they did not see the situation as being ideal, they saw the plan 
as workable, and they have expressed a willingness to work with 
in Corvalis. Marc said the children have 
experienced a lot of anxiety about moving, and Brandi's school 
has said this was not a good time for her to move. 
Marc wondered why it was so important for Alicia to leave Utah 
and why Doug was not willing to move to Utah. 
Marc felt he should be granted joint legal and physical 
custody of the children, as the children need him, too. He said 
he wanted to be a parent to his children and not 
father, and he felt he had much to offer them. He felt he could 
provide more stability and continuity for the children, and Marc 
saw himself as being more family oriented 
extended family in Utah. He also stressed that he would : 
the children in the LD3 Church, whereas, he felt Alicia's 
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Brd'ndi indicated bhe liked Doug, dnd the bebt thing dbout 
hiTii was "he's nice." When asked if there was anything she did 
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April thought hdving her parentb be divorced Wdb "okay." 
She indicated she likes being with both parents. When she is 
i t iu L i i e i . W i t h h e j 
> 11 e vv ' juiu 
i i L L i e muie 
April reported a good ieiationbhip with both parentb, dud 
she felt she got alung 
5 r m other vi a: • U d L bi ifcl b i l ly iiiUlU , d U U L l i G 
W i l d L H U l i i U l U b L 
A. "L. : „ 
b a e 
iked dbout her fdther wab 
._ t_ _ . _ „ .. 
ae • b uiy uau . ^ • i J - L U U U i U 
not thi nk of anytni ng she MOuiu cnange aDout aer mother , IDUt \•/aen 
asked if there was anything she did not like about her mother,. 
she indicated her mother yells. She said her mother lust crets 
. OUu . and 'SliB du6b 1U 1 j w e a L u i . l i i _ i e i i d i i i e b 
- d 1 b U i i 
:
 a C 8 N 
d R y t A I uO" L d L i i e i 
iifc! U i U U U t iJS.tJ d U U U L 
i n uu i i i j Jd i m y i t e i u d i e i i L o 
p d i t j a t S h a d b e e n t i u l i d l l y 
d i v o r c e , u 9 i i c i t h ^ r p J. a y 
16 1 V t" ~ 
1161 m O i 6 W l t f i S C i l O O l w O i k . 
a p l 1 i l e i L 
i k61 y t o p i ay wi t1 n e i , u i 
i l l 6 S O L W h * 
161 m o t h e r 
J d b L r K e 1 
s i n c e t h6 
p a r e n t s a s 
li a s h 61 p 6 d being equally 1 
She said her parents had been euuai1y 
likely to praise her and give her hugs and kisses, but her mother 
has been more iikeiy to get angry or yell. Aprii was not sure 
who Sue WOUid rathei discuss a problem with, but She added, "m~y 
dad's usually at work." If ill, she would want both to'take care 
Oi hei. She reported leeiiiig closer to her mother, "cause I See 
her the most . Sile ieeis as happy" when "with Oil 6 parent as the 
other, and she viewed her parents as being equally nice. 
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w e l l t O S u g g e s t i o n s , a n d S n e 1'idS ClOUe d u O O d l o b o i 
c h i l d r e n t o e X p i e S S t h e i r l e e i i i i u S . S h e IS S e n s i t i v e t o t h e 
children's needs, including the importance of them maintaining 
their relationship wit 
Post Script: Recently Alicia announced that she plans on 
delaying her move to Oregon until June when the 
current bCnOui year enub. 
'^ • SUMMA5.Y AND H.SCQHMSNDATIGNS 
By hi story, Alicia has been the primary care giver, both 
during the marriage and since the time of the separation. She 
has her weaknesses, but overall, she has done a good job of 
parenting the children and meeting their needs, and the children 
s e e m h appy 1 i v i n g w i t h h e r . 
Marc has been an excellent provider, and he has recognized 
her limitations as a potential custodial parent due to the 
However, Hare has good basic parenting 
sKiiiS, dnu cue uii iiarea obvious have a close bond with him. If 
granted custody, Marc has the wherewithal to rise to the occasion 
and meet the children needs. It should be noted, though, that 
Marc's desire ior custody is of short duration, and he seems more 
concerned about naving frequent contact with the children rather 
than actually wanting custody. His custody suit is viewed as 
aiore of cLfi attempt to prevent Alicia from moving from the area. 
However, if he is not aijie to accomplish this goal, he is very 
! i r e to h a v e ioin t physical c u s t o dy, a s he is 
n t e r e s t e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g a m a j o r 
Both Alicia and Marc are felt to be capable of raising the 
ch i1dren and havi ng phys i ca1 custody. Both will require 
surrogate care, but it is not entirely clear which parent would 
use it the most. Both parents seem to have quite a bit of 
flexibility, and during the school year, the question of 
surrogate care is less of an issue. Thus the question of which 
parent would require more surrogate care will most likely be 
ba s ed on wno nas t nem t ne mo s t during t he summer mon t h s when t hey 
are not in school. Concerning finances, both parents obviously 
have the means to raise the children in an 
economic setting. 
. Li b L --J Li V u V d i U c l l , 
v s . Larson 
l y e ^ I g a t e e i i 
l i J U U L l\ i I 
^he i r p r e 
"^d I Uei 
i d fe 
i O U S 
! e s t y l e r i v e a 
OiuiTi i L i f t6a t 
a e i d i i U i i d i C 
j _ . i . i _ _. J . . . . _ _. i LU c a e i i i e i 
iup 1 1 6 S d il U a d e i b t ci n d I "a g t a d t t h e C a i l d 
r
 a 1u es and i d e a l s 
i l e b L y i e I S mOTe COuipdL 
'iGu taus j_ar. Many 
family live in Utah, and a move to Oregon will 
difficult for the ch11dren to maintain their r 
However , on the other hand, Alicia offers the 
advantage of a two-parent 
The children have a good relationship "with both parents 
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thdt they would be more closely bunded tu her 
1 L 
znei r mother 
However, based on 
I he u a i 1 dr e n •' b r epo r t, 
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if they are more closely bonded to her, 
The children have struggled with 
;he idea of moving to Oregon, and at this point, they beem to 
iccept the idea that they "will be living there with their mother 
a has been the primary care giver, has 1 
has done a reasonably good job in these 
I do not believe there is sufficient reason to chanoe 
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this may not oe possiDie. 
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